TY - GEN
T1 - VocalPrint
T2 - 18th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems, SenSys 2020
AU - Li, Huining
AU - Xu, Chenhan
AU - Rathore, Aditya Singh
AU - Li, Zhengxiong
AU - Zhang, Hanbin
AU - Song, Chen
AU - Wang, Kun
AU - Su, Lu
AU - Lin, Feng
AU - Ren, Kui
AU - Xu, Wenyao
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 ACM.
PY - 2020/11/16
Y1 - 2020/11/16
N2 - With the continuing growth of voice-controlled devices, voice metrics have been widely used for user identification. However, voice biometrics is vulnerable to replay attacks and ambient noise. We identify that the fundamental vulnerability in voice biometrics is rooted in its indirect sensing modality (e.g., microphone). In this paper, we present VocalPrint, a resilient mmWave interrogation system which directly captures and analyzes the vocal vibrations for user authentication. Specifically, VocalPrint exploits the unique disturbance of the skin-reflect radio frequency (RF) signals around the near-throat region of the user, caused by the vocal vibrations during communication. The complex ambient noise is isolated from the RF signal using a novel resilience-aware clutter suppression approach for preserving fine-grained vocal biometric properties. Afterward, we extract the text-independent vocal tract and vocal source features and input them to an ensemble classifier for user authentication. VocalPrint is practical as it leverages a low-cost, portable, and energy-efficient hardware allowing effortless transition to a smartphone while having sufficient usability as typical voice authentication systems due to its non-contact nature. Our experimental results from 41 participants with different interrogation distances, orientations, and body motions show that VocalPrint can achieve over 96% authentication accuracy even under unfavorable conditions. We demonstrate the resilience of our system against complex noise interference and spoof attacks of various threat levels.
AB - With the continuing growth of voice-controlled devices, voice metrics have been widely used for user identification. However, voice biometrics is vulnerable to replay attacks and ambient noise. We identify that the fundamental vulnerability in voice biometrics is rooted in its indirect sensing modality (e.g., microphone). In this paper, we present VocalPrint, a resilient mmWave interrogation system which directly captures and analyzes the vocal vibrations for user authentication. Specifically, VocalPrint exploits the unique disturbance of the skin-reflect radio frequency (RF) signals around the near-throat region of the user, caused by the vocal vibrations during communication. The complex ambient noise is isolated from the RF signal using a novel resilience-aware clutter suppression approach for preserving fine-grained vocal biometric properties. Afterward, we extract the text-independent vocal tract and vocal source features and input them to an ensemble classifier for user authentication. VocalPrint is practical as it leverages a low-cost, portable, and energy-efficient hardware allowing effortless transition to a smartphone while having sufficient usability as typical voice authentication systems due to its non-contact nature. Our experimental results from 41 participants with different interrogation distances, orientations, and body motions show that VocalPrint can achieve over 96% authentication accuracy even under unfavorable conditions. We demonstrate the resilience of our system against complex noise interference and spoof attacks of various threat levels.
KW - mmWave sensing
KW - voice authentication
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85097565046
U2 - 10.1145/3384419.3430779
DO - 10.1145/3384419.3430779
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85097565046
T3 - SenSys 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 18th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems
SP - 312
EP - 325
BT - SenSys 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 18th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
Y2 - 16 November 2020 through 19 November 2020
ER -