TY - GEN
T1 - Training A Secure Model Against Data-Free Model Extraction
AU - Wang, Zhenyi
AU - Shen, Li
AU - Guo, Junfeng
AU - Duan, Tiehang
AU - Luan, Siyu
AU - Liu, Tongliang
AU - Gao, Mingchen
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025.
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - The objective of data-free model extraction (DFME) is to acquire a pre-trained black-box model solely through query access, without any knowledge of the training data used for the victim model. Defending against DFME is challenging because the attack query data distribution and the attacker’s strategy remain undisclosed to the defender beforehand. However, existing defense methods: (1) are computational and memory inefficient; or (2) can only provide evidence of model theft after the model has already been stolen. To address these limitations, we thus propose an Attack-Aware and Uncertainty-Guided (AAUG) defense method against DFME. AAUG is designed to effectively thwart DFME attacks while concurrently enhancing deployment efficiency. The key strategy involves introducing random weight perturbations to the victim model’s weights during predictions for various inputs. During defensive training, the weights perturbations are maximized on simulated out-of-distribution (OOD) data to heighten the challenge of model theft, while being minimized on in-distribution (ID) training data to preserve model utility. Additionally, we formulate an attack-aware defensive training objective function, reinforcing the model’s resistance to theft attempts. Extensive experiments on defending against both soft-label and hard-label DFME attacks demonstrate the effectiveness of AAUG. In particular, AAUG significantly reduces the accuracy of the clone model and is substantially more efficient than existing defense methods.
AB - The objective of data-free model extraction (DFME) is to acquire a pre-trained black-box model solely through query access, without any knowledge of the training data used for the victim model. Defending against DFME is challenging because the attack query data distribution and the attacker’s strategy remain undisclosed to the defender beforehand. However, existing defense methods: (1) are computational and memory inefficient; or (2) can only provide evidence of model theft after the model has already been stolen. To address these limitations, we thus propose an Attack-Aware and Uncertainty-Guided (AAUG) defense method against DFME. AAUG is designed to effectively thwart DFME attacks while concurrently enhancing deployment efficiency. The key strategy involves introducing random weight perturbations to the victim model’s weights during predictions for various inputs. During defensive training, the weights perturbations are maximized on simulated out-of-distribution (OOD) data to heighten the challenge of model theft, while being minimized on in-distribution (ID) training data to preserve model utility. Additionally, we formulate an attack-aware defensive training objective function, reinforcing the model’s resistance to theft attempts. Extensive experiments on defending against both soft-label and hard-label DFME attacks demonstrate the effectiveness of AAUG. In particular, AAUG significantly reduces the accuracy of the clone model and is substantially more efficient than existing defense methods.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85208574149
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-72986-7_19
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-72986-7_19
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85208574149
SN - 9783031729850
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 323
EP - 340
BT - Computer Vision – ECCV 2024 - 18th European Conference, Proceedings
A2 - Leonardis, Aleš
A2 - Ricci, Elisa
A2 - Roth, Stefan
A2 - Russakovsky, Olga
A2 - Sattler, Torsten
A2 - Varol, Gül
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - 18th European Conference on Computer Vision, ECCV 2024
Y2 - 29 September 2024 through 4 October 2024
ER -