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The Power of Penalties: Negativity-Aware Incentives for High-Quality Crowdsourced Data Labeling

  • Kai Wang
  • , Runze Wu
  • , Yu Xiong
  • , Haifeng Sun
  • , Anran Li
  • , Shaojie Tang
  • , Changjie Fan
  • , Xiang Yang Li
  • University of Science and Technology of China
  • NetEase Fuxi AI Lab

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

High-quality data labeling is essential for training robust machine learning models; however, existing methods often ignore fraud or assume non-negative worker utility, failing to penalize harmful contributions without discouraging participation. To address this, we propose the Negativity-Aware Incentive (NAI) mechanism which introduces two novel components. First, the Ability-Result Characteristic Function (AR-CF) adapts and extends Shapley value theory through signed valuation to explicitly capture both positive and negative contributions, by combining workers' abilities with real-time task results to define contribution values. Second, a dynamic stake pool mechanism employs pre-commitment economics with adaptive dual-control parameters to balance fairness and operational efficiency. Through extensive experiments on multimodal datasets (images, text, audio, video), NAI outperforms state-of-the-art baselines: it improves video labeling accuracy by 16.6%, and reduces fraudulent behaviors by 33.9%. Furthermore, our deployment on the NetEase Youling crowdsourcing platform, serving 430,000 registered workers with 80,000 monthly active workers, validates NAI's real-world viability. Real-time A/B testing shows a 59.6% improvement in labeling quality for beginner tasks and a consistent reduction in fraud rates (14.8%-33.9%) across difficulty levels. This work establishes a paradigm shift in crowdsourcing system design, demonstrating that explicit negative modeling can enhance data quality, optimize costs, and foster participation at scale.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationWWW 2026 - Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2026
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages51-62
Number of pages12
ISBN (Electronic)9798400723070
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 12 2026
Event35th ACM Web Conference, WWW 2026 - Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Duration: Jun 29 2026Jul 3 2026

Publication series

NameWWW 2026 - Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2026

Conference

Conference35th ACM Web Conference, WWW 2026
Country/TerritoryUnited Arab Emirates
CityDubai
Period06/29/2607/3/26

Keywords

  • crowdsourcing
  • mechanism design
  • repeated game
  • stake pool

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