TY - GEN
T1 - The Power of Penalties
T2 - 35th ACM Web Conference, WWW 2026
AU - Wang, Kai
AU - Wu, Runze
AU - Xiong, Yu
AU - Sun, Haifeng
AU - Li, Anran
AU - Tang, Shaojie
AU - Fan, Changjie
AU - Li, Xiang Yang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2026 Owner/Author.
PY - 2026/4/12
Y1 - 2026/4/12
N2 - High-quality data labeling is essential for training robust machine learning models; however, existing methods often ignore fraud or assume non-negative worker utility, failing to penalize harmful contributions without discouraging participation. To address this, we propose the Negativity-Aware Incentive (NAI) mechanism which introduces two novel components. First, the Ability-Result Characteristic Function (AR-CF) adapts and extends Shapley value theory through signed valuation to explicitly capture both positive and negative contributions, by combining workers' abilities with real-time task results to define contribution values. Second, a dynamic stake pool mechanism employs pre-commitment economics with adaptive dual-control parameters to balance fairness and operational efficiency. Through extensive experiments on multimodal datasets (images, text, audio, video), NAI outperforms state-of-the-art baselines: it improves video labeling accuracy by 16.6%, and reduces fraudulent behaviors by 33.9%. Furthermore, our deployment on the NetEase Youling crowdsourcing platform, serving 430,000 registered workers with 80,000 monthly active workers, validates NAI's real-world viability. Real-time A/B testing shows a 59.6% improvement in labeling quality for beginner tasks and a consistent reduction in fraud rates (14.8%-33.9%) across difficulty levels. This work establishes a paradigm shift in crowdsourcing system design, demonstrating that explicit negative modeling can enhance data quality, optimize costs, and foster participation at scale.
AB - High-quality data labeling is essential for training robust machine learning models; however, existing methods often ignore fraud or assume non-negative worker utility, failing to penalize harmful contributions without discouraging participation. To address this, we propose the Negativity-Aware Incentive (NAI) mechanism which introduces two novel components. First, the Ability-Result Characteristic Function (AR-CF) adapts and extends Shapley value theory through signed valuation to explicitly capture both positive and negative contributions, by combining workers' abilities with real-time task results to define contribution values. Second, a dynamic stake pool mechanism employs pre-commitment economics with adaptive dual-control parameters to balance fairness and operational efficiency. Through extensive experiments on multimodal datasets (images, text, audio, video), NAI outperforms state-of-the-art baselines: it improves video labeling accuracy by 16.6%, and reduces fraudulent behaviors by 33.9%. Furthermore, our deployment on the NetEase Youling crowdsourcing platform, serving 430,000 registered workers with 80,000 monthly active workers, validates NAI's real-world viability. Real-time A/B testing shows a 59.6% improvement in labeling quality for beginner tasks and a consistent reduction in fraud rates (14.8%-33.9%) across difficulty levels. This work establishes a paradigm shift in crowdsourcing system design, demonstrating that explicit negative modeling can enhance data quality, optimize costs, and foster participation at scale.
KW - crowdsourcing
KW - mechanism design
KW - repeated game
KW - stake pool
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105038590051
U2 - 10.1145/3774904.3792170
DO - 10.1145/3774904.3792170
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105038590051
T3 - WWW 2026 - Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2026
SP - 51
EP - 62
BT - WWW 2026 - Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2026
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
Y2 - 29 June 2026 through 3 July 2026
ER -