The game-theoretic national interstate economic model: Economically optimizing U.S. aviation security policies against terrorist attacks

The study proposes an approach to assessing airport and aviation security policies, which incorporates terrorist attack behaviors with economic impacts stemming from disruption of U.S. airport systems. Terrorist attacks involve complicated strategic behaviors of terrorists, while various defenders need to consider the degree of negative impacts that may occur via complicated paths. Simultaneous attacks will make this situation more complicated, because defending entities must secure airports and aviation systems with more tightly integrated inter-governmental collaborations. This study, for the first time, suggests a dynamic method to design the complicated micro-level behavioral strategies with macro-level economic impacts. In terms of game strategies, the current study only considers a competitive game situation between a defender and an attacker. In terms of the macro-level economic model, the National Interstate Economic Model (NIEMO) is introduced, which is a spatially disaggregated economic model used for the U.S. By combining these two approaches, a new framework is called the Game Theoretic National Interstate Economic Model (G-NIEMO). G-NIEMO, then, can be used to assess probabilistic costs of airport closure when potential terrorist attacks occur under the circumstance of considering the allocation of a government’ resources for designing airport security optimally by event location and industry type. NIEMO has been widely applied through a variety of empirical studies, but the competitive game model has not yet combined successfully. Based on the basic algorithm applied in the “attacker-defender game,” this chapter explains how G-NIEMO could be achieved. Further, establishing a cooperative coordination system and collective countermeasures against terrorism is necessary to cope with much more complicated forms of terrorist attacks such as simultaneous attacks and cyber-attacks. G-NIEMO can meet these needs through a collaborative gaming model. When applying G-NIEMO practically to simulate comprehensive defense strategies, for example, for urban critical infrastructure systems, corresponding estimated probabilistic impacts can be prepared. Therefore, G-NIEMO can be used to establish equilibrium strategies for protecting U.S. territory, creating general guidelines and assessing government resource allocations.