The Effect of US Troop Deployment on Host States' Foreign Policy

Major powers often deploy troops abroad with the consent of host states. The stated aim of these deployments is often both to protect the host state and to foster stability in the region. Drawing from an extension of Palmer and Morgan's two-good theory of foreign policy, the authors explore some of the (perhaps unintended) effects of troop deployments abroad on the foreign policies of the host states. In particular, the authors focus on the effects of US deployments. The authors argue that as the number of US troops deployed to a host state increases, we should expect the host state to reduce its own troop levels, be more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes, and be less likely to be the target of interstate disputes. The authors test these hypotheses using data on US troop deployments abroad from 1950 to 2005 and discuss implications that their findings may have for US foreign policy.