Shedding Light on Inconsistencies in Grid Cybersecurity: Disconnects and Recommendations

The operational, academic, and policy communities disagree on which threats against the power grid are likely and what damage would ensue. For instance, the feasibility and impact of MadIoT-style attacks is being actively debated. By surveying grid experts (N=18) we find that disagreements are not unique to MadIoT attacks but occur across multiple well-studied grid threats. Based on prior work and our survey, we hypothesize that the disagreements stem from inconsistencies in how grid threats are modeled. We identify five likely causes of modeling inconsistencies: 1) using unrealistic grid topologies, 2) assuming unrealistic capabilities for attackers, 3) exploring too few grid scenarios, 4) using incomplete simulators that omit relevant grid processes, and 5) using simulators that incorrectly model key grid processes. To check these hypotheses, we create a modeling framework and examine how these factors change our understanding of the feasibility and impact of grid threats. We use four diverse grid threats as case studies: MadIoT, False Data Injection Attacks, Substation Circuit Breaker Takeover, and Power Plant Takeover. We find that each of our hypothe-sized causes of modeling inconsistencies has a significant effect on modeling the outcomes of attacks. For example, we find that MadIoT attacks are much less feasible and require significantly more high-wattage IoT devices on realistic topologies than on topologies previously used to model them. In contrast, we find that Substation Circuit Breaker Takeover attacks are much more feasible in emergency scenarios and may require significantly fewer substations for failure than previous modeling suggested. We conclude with actionable recommendations for accurately assessing the impact of threats against the grid.