Public financing and candidate participation in gubernatorial elections

In recent years, since the advent of full public funding of elections in Maine and Arizona in 2000, public financing of elections has received increased scholarly and media attention. Since the implementation of these new public funding systems, there has been no shortage of studies examining their effects on electoral competition (e.g., Government Accountability Office 2003; Malhotra 2008; Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006). Like studies of the effects of public financing systems more generally (e.g., Adams 2007; Bardwell 2002; Hamm and Hogan 2008; La Raja 2007; Mayer and Wood 1995), however, no clear determination of the effect of public financing on candidate entry has been made. I n this chapter, I make three contributions to the study of the effects of public financing on candidate entry. First, I include a more complete candidate typology. In particular, I examine the effect of public funding on candidate entry to open seats, not just incumbent-defended seats, which have been the focus of previous research. I also distinguish between candidates that have held previous elective office ("experienced candidates") and those who have not ("amateur candidates"), as there is some reason to believe experienced (or "quality") candidates are more likely to be enticed by public funding. Second, I provide a theoretical framework within which the public funding of candidates is expected to operate, situating its potential effect in the standard decision-making calculus of a potential candidate for elective office (e.g., Black 1972). Third, my results suggest that under specific circumstances public financing may encourage greater candidate participation, but that on the whole public funding does not appear to be increasing the number of candidates competing in elections, at least gubernatorial elections. T he chapter proceeds in the following fashion. In the next section I present Black's (1972) decision-making calculus of potential candidates for office and discuss how public funding systems might affect this calculus. Then, I present the data on gubernatorial elections from 1980 to 1998 used to test the theoretical expectations laid out in the preceding section. Next, I present and discuss my results, and then conclude.