TY - GEN
T1 - Proving multimedia integrity using sanitizable signatures recorded on blockchain
AU - Nandakumar, Karthik
AU - Ratha, Nalini
AU - Pankanti, Sharathchandra
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Association for Computing Machinery.
PY - 2019/7/2
Y1 - 2019/7/2
N2 - While significant advancements have been made in the field of multimedia forensics to detect altered content, existing techniques mostly focus on enabling the content recipient to verify the content integrity without any inputs from the content creator. In many application scenarios, the creator has a strong incentive to establish the provenance and integrity of the multimedia data created and released by him. Hence, there is a strong need for mechanisms that allow the content creator to prove the authenticity of the released content. Since blockchain technology provides an immutable distributed database, it is an ideal solution for reliably time-stamping content with its creation time and storing an irrefutable signature of the content at the time of its creation. However, a simple digital signature scheme does not allow modification of the content after the initial commitment. Authorized multimedia content alteration by its creator is often necessary (e.g., redaction of faces to protect the privacy of individuals in a video, redaction of sensitive fields in a text document) before the content is distributed. The main contributions of this paper are: (i) a novel sanitizable signature scheme that enables the content creator to prove the integrity of the redacted content, while preventing the recipients from reconstructing the redacted segments based on the published commitment, and (ii) a blockchain-based solution for securely managing the sanitizable signature. The proposed solution employs a robust hashing scheme using chameleon hash function and Merkle tree to generate the initial signature, which is stored on the blockchain. The auxiliary data required for the integrity verification step is retained by the content creator and only a signature of this auxiliary data is stored on the blockchain. Any modifications to the multimedia content requires only updating the signature of the auxiliary data, which is securely recorded on the blockchain. We demonstrate that the proposed approach enables verification of integrity of redacted multimedia content without compromising the content privacy requirements.
AB - While significant advancements have been made in the field of multimedia forensics to detect altered content, existing techniques mostly focus on enabling the content recipient to verify the content integrity without any inputs from the content creator. In many application scenarios, the creator has a strong incentive to establish the provenance and integrity of the multimedia data created and released by him. Hence, there is a strong need for mechanisms that allow the content creator to prove the authenticity of the released content. Since blockchain technology provides an immutable distributed database, it is an ideal solution for reliably time-stamping content with its creation time and storing an irrefutable signature of the content at the time of its creation. However, a simple digital signature scheme does not allow modification of the content after the initial commitment. Authorized multimedia content alteration by its creator is often necessary (e.g., redaction of faces to protect the privacy of individuals in a video, redaction of sensitive fields in a text document) before the content is distributed. The main contributions of this paper are: (i) a novel sanitizable signature scheme that enables the content creator to prove the integrity of the redacted content, while preventing the recipients from reconstructing the redacted segments based on the published commitment, and (ii) a blockchain-based solution for securely managing the sanitizable signature. The proposed solution employs a robust hashing scheme using chameleon hash function and Merkle tree to generate the initial signature, which is stored on the blockchain. The auxiliary data required for the integrity verification step is retained by the content creator and only a signature of this auxiliary data is stored on the blockchain. Any modifications to the multimedia content requires only updating the signature of the auxiliary data, which is securely recorded on the blockchain. We demonstrate that the proposed approach enables verification of integrity of redacted multimedia content without compromising the content privacy requirements.
KW - Authenticity
KW - Blockchain
KW - Chameleon hash
KW - Merkle tree
KW - Multimedia integrity
KW - Redaction
KW - Robust hashing
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85069963180
U2 - 10.1145/3335203.3335729
DO - 10.1145/3335203.3335729
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85069963180
T3 - IH and MMSec 2019 - Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia Security
SP - 151
EP - 160
BT - IH and MMSec 2019 - Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
T2 - 7th ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia Security, IH and MMSec 2019
Y2 - 3 July 2019 through 5 July 2019
ER -