Abstract
Evolutionary accounts of morality consider behavior in rather simple scenarios. Evolutionary work on fairness focuses on the division of a windfall and, importantly, assumes that the positions of those involved are entirely symmetric. I consider more complicated strategic settings and find that there is a strong tendency for evolution to produce divisions consistent with the so-called Nash bargaining solution. I also uncover the evolutionary importance of comprehensiveness, an often-overlooked feature of division problems.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1185-1198 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2021 |
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