TY - GEN
T1 - My smartphone knows what you print
T2 - 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2016
AU - Song, Chen
AU - Lin, Feng
AU - Ba, Zongjie
AU - Ren, Kui
AU - Zhou, Chi
AU - Xu, Wenyao
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 ACM.
PY - 2016/10/24
Y1 - 2016/10/24
N2 - Additive manufacturing, also known as 3D printing, has been increasingly applied to fabricate highly intellectual property (IP) sensitive products. However, the related IP protection issues in 3D printers are still largely underexplored. On the other hand, smartphones are equipped with rich onboard sensors and have been applied to pervasive mobile surveillance in many applications. These facts raise one critical question: is it possible that smartphones access the sidechannel signals of 3D printer and then hack the IP information? To answer this, we perform an end-to-end study on exploring smartphone-based side-channel attacks against 3D printers. Specifically, we formulate the problem of the IP side-channel attack in 3D printing. Then, we investigate the possible acoustic and magnetic side-channel attacks using the smartphone built-in sensors. Moreover, we explore a magnetic-enhanced side-channel attack model to accurately deduce the vital directional operations of 3D printer. Experimental results show that by exploiting the side-channel signals collected by smartphones, we can successfully reconstruct the physical prints and their G-code with Mean Tendency Error of 5.87% on regular designs and 9.67% on complex designs, respectively. Our study demonstrates this new and practical smartphone-based side channel attack on compromising IP information during 3D printing.
AB - Additive manufacturing, also known as 3D printing, has been increasingly applied to fabricate highly intellectual property (IP) sensitive products. However, the related IP protection issues in 3D printers are still largely underexplored. On the other hand, smartphones are equipped with rich onboard sensors and have been applied to pervasive mobile surveillance in many applications. These facts raise one critical question: is it possible that smartphones access the sidechannel signals of 3D printer and then hack the IP information? To answer this, we perform an end-to-end study on exploring smartphone-based side-channel attacks against 3D printers. Specifically, we formulate the problem of the IP side-channel attack in 3D printing. Then, we investigate the possible acoustic and magnetic side-channel attacks using the smartphone built-in sensors. Moreover, we explore a magnetic-enhanced side-channel attack model to accurately deduce the vital directional operations of 3D printer. Experimental results show that by exploiting the side-channel signals collected by smartphones, we can successfully reconstruct the physical prints and their G-code with Mean Tendency Error of 5.87% on regular designs and 9.67% on complex designs, respectively. Our study demonstrates this new and practical smartphone-based side channel attack on compromising IP information during 3D printing.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84995475547
U2 - 10.1145/2976749.2978300
DO - 10.1145/2976749.2978300
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84995475547
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 895
EP - 907
BT - CCS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
Y2 - 24 October 2016 through 28 October 2016
ER -