TY - GEN
T1 - Load balance vs energy efficiency in traffic engineering
T2 - 32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013
AU - Zhao, Yangming
AU - Wang, Sheng
AU - Xu, Shizhong
AU - Wang, Xiong
AU - Gao, Xiujiao
AU - Qiao, Chunming
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - In this paper, we study the tradeoff between two important traffic engineering objectives: load balance and energy efficiency. Although traditional commonly used multi-objective optimization methods can yield a Pareto efficient solution, they need to construct an aggregate objective function (AOF) or model one of the two objectives as a constraint in the optimization problem formulation. As a result, it is difficult to achieve a fair tradeoff between these two objectives. Accordingly, we induce a Nash bargaining framework which treats the two objectives as two virtual players in a game theoretic model, who negotiate how traffic should be routed in order to optimize both objectives. During the negotiation, each of them announces its performance threat value to reduce its cost, so the model is regarded as a threat value game. Our analysis shows that no agreement can be achieved if each player sets its threat value selfishly. To avoid such a negotiation break-down, we modify the threat value game to have a repeated process and design a mechanism to not only guarantee an agreement, but also generate a fair solution. In addition, the insights from this work are also useful for achieving a fair tradeoff in other multi-objective optimization problems.
AB - In this paper, we study the tradeoff between two important traffic engineering objectives: load balance and energy efficiency. Although traditional commonly used multi-objective optimization methods can yield a Pareto efficient solution, they need to construct an aggregate objective function (AOF) or model one of the two objectives as a constraint in the optimization problem formulation. As a result, it is difficult to achieve a fair tradeoff between these two objectives. Accordingly, we induce a Nash bargaining framework which treats the two objectives as two virtual players in a game theoretic model, who negotiate how traffic should be routed in order to optimize both objectives. During the negotiation, each of them announces its performance threat value to reduce its cost, so the model is regarded as a threat value game. Our analysis shows that no agreement can be achieved if each player sets its threat value selfishly. To avoid such a negotiation break-down, we modify the threat value game to have a repeated process and design a mechanism to not only guarantee an agreement, but also generate a fair solution. In addition, the insights from this work are also useful for achieving a fair tradeoff in other multi-objective optimization problems.
KW - Energy Efficiency
KW - Load Balance
KW - Multi-Objective Optimization
KW - Nash Bargaining
KW - Traffic Engineering
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84883082200
U2 - 10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6566829
DO - 10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6566829
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84883082200
SN - 9781467359467
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
SP - 530
EP - 534
BT - 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013
Y2 - 14 April 2013 through 19 April 2013
ER -