TY - GEN
T1 - Is Difficulty Calibration All We Need? Towards More Practical Membership Inference Attacks
AU - He, Yu
AU - Li, Boheng
AU - Wang, Yao
AU - Yang, Mengda
AU - Wang, Juan
AU - Hu, Hongxin
AU - Zhao, Xingyu
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
PY - 2024/12/9
Y1 - 2024/12/9
N2 - The vulnerability of machine learning models to Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) has garnered considerable attention in recent years. These attacks determine whether a data sample belongs to the model’s training set or not. Recent research has focused on reference-based attacks, which leverage difficulty calibration with independently trained reference models. While empirical studies have demonstrated its effectiveness, there is a notable gap in our understanding of the circumstances under which it succeeds or fails. In this paper, we take a further step towards a deeper understanding of the role of difficulty calibration. Our observations reveal inherent limitations in calibration methods, leading to the misclassification of non-members and suboptimal performance, particularly on high-loss samples. We further identify that these errors stem from an imperfect sampling of the potential distribution and a strong dependence of membership scores on the model parameters. By shedding light on these issues, we propose RAPID: a query-efficient and computation-efficient MIA that directly Re-leverAges the original membershiP scores to mItigate the errors in Difficulty calibration. Our experimental results, spanning 9 datasets and 5 model architectures, demonstrate that RAPID outperforms previous state-of-the-art attacks (e.g., LiRA and Canary offline) across different metrics while remaining computationally efficient. Our observations and analysis challenge the current de facto paradigm of difficulty calibration in high-precision inference, encouraging greater attention to the persistent risks posed by MIAs in more practical scenarios.1
AB - The vulnerability of machine learning models to Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) has garnered considerable attention in recent years. These attacks determine whether a data sample belongs to the model’s training set or not. Recent research has focused on reference-based attacks, which leverage difficulty calibration with independently trained reference models. While empirical studies have demonstrated its effectiveness, there is a notable gap in our understanding of the circumstances under which it succeeds or fails. In this paper, we take a further step towards a deeper understanding of the role of difficulty calibration. Our observations reveal inherent limitations in calibration methods, leading to the misclassification of non-members and suboptimal performance, particularly on high-loss samples. We further identify that these errors stem from an imperfect sampling of the potential distribution and a strong dependence of membership scores on the model parameters. By shedding light on these issues, we propose RAPID: a query-efficient and computation-efficient MIA that directly Re-leverAges the original membershiP scores to mItigate the errors in Difficulty calibration. Our experimental results, spanning 9 datasets and 5 model architectures, demonstrate that RAPID outperforms previous state-of-the-art attacks (e.g., LiRA and Canary offline) across different metrics while remaining computationally efficient. Our observations and analysis challenge the current de facto paradigm of difficulty calibration in high-precision inference, encouraging greater attention to the persistent risks posed by MIAs in more practical scenarios.1
KW - computational cost
KW - difficulty calibration
KW - membership inference
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85210662355
U2 - 10.1145/3658644.3690316
DO - 10.1145/3658644.3690316
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85210662355
T3 - CCS 2024 - Proceedings of the 2024 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 1226
EP - 1240
BT - CCS 2024 - Proceedings of the 2024 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
T2 - 31st ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2024
Y2 - 14 October 2024 through 18 October 2024
ER -