Information visibility and its impact in a supply chain

Jianghua Wu; Ananth Iyer; Paul V. Preckel

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2015.11.013

Information visibility and its impact in a supply chain

Jianghua Wu
, Ananth Iyer
, Paul V. Preckel

MGT Dean's Office Administration

Renmin University of China
Purdue University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze a supply chain with two retailers facing independent demands who share an upstream supply market. Retailers can choose the extent to share signals on demand. We show that (a) there are conditions under which a retailer who unilaterally shares information, while receiving no information in return, may be better off while the recipient is worse off, (b) partial information sharing may be an equilibrium strategy.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	74-79
Number of pages	6
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	44
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.11.013
State	Published - Jan 1 2016

Keywords

Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Game theory
Information sharing
Learning effect
Supply chain

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10.1016/j.orl.2015.11.013

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abstract = "We analyze a supply chain with two retailers facing independent demands who share an upstream supply market. Retailers can choose the extent to share signals on demand. We show that (a) there are conditions under which a retailer who unilaterally shares information, while receiving no information in return, may be better off while the recipient is worse off, (b) partial information sharing may be an equilibrium strategy.",

keywords = "Bayesian Nash equilibrium, Game theory, Information sharing, Learning effect, Supply chain",

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AU - Preckel, Paul V.

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N2 - We analyze a supply chain with two retailers facing independent demands who share an upstream supply market. Retailers can choose the extent to share signals on demand. We show that (a) there are conditions under which a retailer who unilaterally shares information, while receiving no information in return, may be better off while the recipient is worse off, (b) partial information sharing may be an equilibrium strategy.

AB - We analyze a supply chain with two retailers facing independent demands who share an upstream supply market. Retailers can choose the extent to share signals on demand. We show that (a) there are conditions under which a retailer who unilaterally shares information, while receiving no information in return, may be better off while the recipient is worse off, (b) partial information sharing may be an equilibrium strategy.

KW - Bayesian Nash equilibrium

KW - Game theory

KW - Information sharing

KW - Learning effect

KW - Supply chain

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84949560782

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DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2015.11.013

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VL - 44

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Information visibility and its impact in a supply chain

Abstract

Keywords

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