Focus, pragmatic presupposition, and activated propositions

Although it is widely recognized that differences in focal accent represent what are in some sense differences in what is given and what is new, there remains considerable confusion in the literature as to what the relevant notion of 'given' is. This paper argues that when one distinguishes 'given' in the sense of 'presupposed' from 'given' in the sense of 'activated' (in the mind of the hearer), it becomes clear that it is the latter rather than the former which characterizes the complement of focus. While there is literature that assumes this position, there is a considerable body of literature that assumes that the relevant notion is in fact presupposition and little explicit argumentation that it is not presupposition. In addition, some of the literature that recognizes the relevance of activation mistakenly assumes that something that is activated is necessarily presupposed. The reason for this is that much of the literature ignores the distinction between propositions which are mentally represented and propositions which are believed.