Deterrence (Theory), Economics of

Isaac Ehrlich

doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2618

Deterrence (Theory), Economics of

Isaac Ehrlich

Finance

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In both its classical and modern versions the economic theory of crime is predicated on ‘the deterrence hypothesis’ - the assumption that potential and actual offenders respond to both positive and negative incentives, and that the volume of offences in the population is influenced by law enforcement and other means of crime prevention. This article traces the evolution of the modern approach to crime from the traditional focus on the interaction between offenders and law enforcers to the development of a more comprehensive ‘market model’ under both partial and general equilibrium settings. Theoretical extensions also emphasize alternative criteria for optimal law enforcement.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Third Edition
Publisher	Palgrave Macmillan
Pages	2812-2817
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781349951895
ISBN (Print)	9781349951888
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2618
State	Published - Jan 1 2018

Keywords

Beccaria, C.
Becker, G.
Bentham, J.
Bribery
Deterrence
Deterrence hypothesis
Ehrlich, I.
Expected utility hypothesis
Pecuniary vs. non-pecuniary penalties
Public choice
Public enforcement of law
Punishment
Rent seeking

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10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2618

Cite this

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KW - Becker, G.

KW - Bentham, J.

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KW - Deterrence hypothesis

KW - Ehrlich, I.

KW - Expected utility hypothesis

KW - Pecuniary vs. non-pecuniary penalties

KW - Public choice

KW - Public enforcement of law

KW - Punishment

KW - Rent seeking

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Deterrence (Theory), Economics of

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Keywords

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