Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that the voting premium in the Korean securities market is strongly related to the structure of corporate ownership. We find that the premium attached to voting stock is positively and significantly associated with the control value of a block of shares held by minority shareholders. We also find that the premium is negatively related to both the fraction of shares that are voting shares and the market value of equity. Empirical results indicate that private benefits of control in Korea are worth about 10% of the value of equity.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 35-54 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Journal of Corporate Finance |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 1999 |
Keywords
- G32
- Oceanic game
- Ownership structure
- Shapley value
- Voting right
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