TY - GEN
T1 - Command Hijacking on Voice-Controlled IoT in Amazon Alexa Platform
AU - Ding, Wenbo
AU - Liao, Song
AU - Cheng, Long
AU - Mi, Xianghang
AU - Zhao, Ziming
AU - Hu, Hongxin
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
PY - 2024/7/1
Y1 - 2024/7/1
N2 - Voice Personal Assistants (VPA) are becoming popular entry points to control connected devices in an IoT environment, e.g., by invoking Amazon Alexa voice-apps (called skills) to turn on/off lights through voice commands. Amazon Alexa platform allows third-party developers to build skills and publish them to marketplaces, which greatly extends the functionalities of VPA. Despite the many convenient features, there are increasing security and safety concerns about VPA-controlled IoT systems. Previous research demonstrated the prevalence of potentially malicious or problematic skills in the marketplace. However, existing works mainly focus on non-IoT skills (e.g., skills under the Kids and Health categories). The security and safety risks of IoT skills are largely under-explored. In this work, we discover new vulnerabilities in the Amazon Alexa platform, which allows malicious third-party developers to hijack Alexa’s built-in voice commands to invoke malicious IoT skills. We present three new attacks hijacking Alexa’s built-in IoT commands, including Command Invocation Confounding Attack, Custom Command Attack, and Command-Intent Hijacking Attack. We also find a vulnerability that allows arbitrary control of smarthome devices in the back-end code. We evaluate the success rate for each attack and prove that they can be used by malicious developers. In particular, we demonstrate that skills in the Connected Car category using Alexa’s built-in intents can be hijacked by customized IoT skills. We also design and implement IoTSkillAnalyzer, a dynamic testing tool to examine IoT skills on the Alexa skills store. After analyzing 488 Alexa 3rd-party IoT skills using IoTSkillAnalyzer, we identified 52 skills with potential command hijacking attacks. We also found that 26 suspicious skills have hidden behaviors potentially caused by the Skill Back-end Code Manipulation vulnerability after they receive normal commands, such as failing to control devices, taking hidden actions, and providing wrong response information to users.
AB - Voice Personal Assistants (VPA) are becoming popular entry points to control connected devices in an IoT environment, e.g., by invoking Amazon Alexa voice-apps (called skills) to turn on/off lights through voice commands. Amazon Alexa platform allows third-party developers to build skills and publish them to marketplaces, which greatly extends the functionalities of VPA. Despite the many convenient features, there are increasing security and safety concerns about VPA-controlled IoT systems. Previous research demonstrated the prevalence of potentially malicious or problematic skills in the marketplace. However, existing works mainly focus on non-IoT skills (e.g., skills under the Kids and Health categories). The security and safety risks of IoT skills are largely under-explored. In this work, we discover new vulnerabilities in the Amazon Alexa platform, which allows malicious third-party developers to hijack Alexa’s built-in voice commands to invoke malicious IoT skills. We present three new attacks hijacking Alexa’s built-in IoT commands, including Command Invocation Confounding Attack, Custom Command Attack, and Command-Intent Hijacking Attack. We also find a vulnerability that allows arbitrary control of smarthome devices in the back-end code. We evaluate the success rate for each attack and prove that they can be used by malicious developers. In particular, we demonstrate that skills in the Connected Car category using Alexa’s built-in intents can be hijacked by customized IoT skills. We also design and implement IoTSkillAnalyzer, a dynamic testing tool to examine IoT skills on the Alexa skills store. After analyzing 488 Alexa 3rd-party IoT skills using IoTSkillAnalyzer, we identified 52 skills with potential command hijacking attacks. We also found that 26 suspicious skills have hidden behaviors potentially caused by the Skill Back-end Code Manipulation vulnerability after they receive normal commands, such as failing to control devices, taking hidden actions, and providing wrong response information to users.
KW - Amazon Alexa
KW - Hijacking Attack
KW - IoT
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85199252295
U2 - 10.1145/3634737.3657010
DO - 10.1145/3634737.3657010
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85199252295
T3 - ACM AsiaCCS 2024 - Proceedings of the 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 654
EP - 666
BT - ACM AsiaCCS 2024 - Proceedings of the 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
T2 - 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, AsiaCCS 2024
Y2 - 1 July 2024 through 5 July 2024
ER -