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Command Hijacking on Voice-Controlled IoT in Amazon Alexa Platform

  • SUNY Buffalo
  • Clemson University
  • University of Science and Technology of China

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

Voice Personal Assistants (VPA) are becoming popular entry points to control connected devices in an IoT environment, e.g., by invoking Amazon Alexa voice-apps (called skills) to turn on/off lights through voice commands. Amazon Alexa platform allows third-party developers to build skills and publish them to marketplaces, which greatly extends the functionalities of VPA. Despite the many convenient features, there are increasing security and safety concerns about VPA-controlled IoT systems. Previous research demonstrated the prevalence of potentially malicious or problematic skills in the marketplace. However, existing works mainly focus on non-IoT skills (e.g., skills under the Kids and Health categories). The security and safety risks of IoT skills are largely under-explored. In this work, we discover new vulnerabilities in the Amazon Alexa platform, which allows malicious third-party developers to hijack Alexa’s built-in voice commands to invoke malicious IoT skills. We present three new attacks hijacking Alexa’s built-in IoT commands, including Command Invocation Confounding Attack, Custom Command Attack, and Command-Intent Hijacking Attack. We also find a vulnerability that allows arbitrary control of smarthome devices in the back-end code. We evaluate the success rate for each attack and prove that they can be used by malicious developers. In particular, we demonstrate that skills in the Connected Car category using Alexa’s built-in intents can be hijacked by customized IoT skills. We also design and implement IoTSkillAnalyzer, a dynamic testing tool to examine IoT skills on the Alexa skills store. After analyzing 488 Alexa 3rd-party IoT skills using IoTSkillAnalyzer, we identified 52 skills with potential command hijacking attacks. We also found that 26 suspicious skills have hidden behaviors potentially caused by the Skill Back-end Code Manipulation vulnerability after they receive normal commands, such as failing to control devices, taking hidden actions, and providing wrong response information to users.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationACM AsiaCCS 2024 - Proceedings of the 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages654-666
Number of pages13
ISBN (Electronic)9798400704826
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2024
Event19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, AsiaCCS 2024 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: Jul 1 2024 → Jul 5 2024

Publication series

NameACM AsiaCCS 2024 - Proceedings of the 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Conference

Conference19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, AsiaCCS 2024
Country/TerritorySingapore
CitySingapore
Period07/1/24 → 07/5/24

Keywords

  • Amazon Alexa
  • Hijacking Attack
  • IoT

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