Coalitional games on graphs: Core structure, substitutes and frugality

Rahul Garg; Vijay Kumar; Atri Rudra; Akshat Verma

Coalitional games on graphs: Core structure, substitutes and frugality

Rahul Garg
, Vijay Kumar
, Atri Rudra
, Akshat Verma

Department of Computer Science and Engineering

IBM
Strat. Plan. and Optimization Team

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

Some notions in mechanism design are correlated to concepts from game theory. The notion of frugality is formalized and extended to define the frugality ratio of a mechanism. The equivalence of frugality is established and a slightly modified version of the agents are substitutes condition. This leads to a three-way equivalence of the core being a lattice, agents satisfying the substitutes condition, and the VCG payment being frugal.

Original language	English
Pages	248-249
Number of pages	2
State	Published - 2003
Event	Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - San Diego, CA, United States Duration: Jun 9 2003 → Jun 12 2003

Conference

Conference	Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Country/Territory	United States
City	San Diego, CA
Period	06/9/03 → 06/12/03

Keywords

Agents
Core
Frugality
Game theory
Lattice
Substitutes
VCG mechanism

Cite this

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title = "Coalitional games on graphs: Core structure, substitutes and frugality",

abstract = "Some notions in mechanism design are correlated to concepts from game theory. The notion of frugality is formalized and extended to define the frugality ratio of a mechanism. The equivalence of frugality is established and a slightly modified version of the agents are substitutes condition. This leads to a three-way equivalence of the core being a lattice, agents satisfying the substitutes condition, and the VCG payment being frugal.",

keywords = "Agents, Core, Frugality, Game theory, Lattice, Substitutes, VCG mechanism",

author = "Rahul Garg and Vijay Kumar and Atri Rudra and Akshat Verma",

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pages = "248--249",

note = "Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce ; Conference date: 09-06-2003 Through 12-06-2003",

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T1 - Coalitional games on graphs

T2 - Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

AU - Garg, Rahul

AU - Kumar, Vijay

AU - Rudra, Atri

AU - Verma, Akshat

PY - 2003

Y1 - 2003

N2 - Some notions in mechanism design are correlated to concepts from game theory. The notion of frugality is formalized and extended to define the frugality ratio of a mechanism. The equivalence of frugality is established and a slightly modified version of the agents are substitutes condition. This leads to a three-way equivalence of the core being a lattice, agents satisfying the substitutes condition, and the VCG payment being frugal.

AB - Some notions in mechanism design are correlated to concepts from game theory. The notion of frugality is formalized and extended to define the frugality ratio of a mechanism. The equivalence of frugality is established and a slightly modified version of the agents are substitutes condition. This leads to a three-way equivalence of the core being a lattice, agents satisfying the substitutes condition, and the VCG payment being frugal.

KW - Agents

KW - Core

KW - Frugality

KW - Game theory

KW - Lattice

KW - Substitutes

KW - VCG mechanism

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0242624657

M3 - Paper

AN - SCOPUS:0242624657

SP - 248

EP - 249

Y2 - 9 June 2003 through 12 June 2003

ER -

Coalitional games on graphs: Core structure, substitutes and frugality

Abstract

Conference

Keywords

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