Chief executive officer compensation, firm performance, and strategic coopetition: A seemingly unrelated regression approach

Winston T. Lin; Juehui Shi

doi:10.1002/mde.3098

Chief executive officer compensation, firm performance, and strategic coopetition: A seemingly unrelated regression approach

Winston T. Lin
, Juehui Shi

Operations Management and Strategy

Angelo State University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

Coopetition denotes the simultaneous cooperation and competition in a business relationship and is broader in depth and width than competition. This pioneering comparative study employs a seemingly unrelated regression system to investigate the impact of peer-pay bias and pay-for-relative performance upon the highly controversial chief executive officer (CEO) pay. The analysis of the 21 Dow–Jones firms from 1992 to 2013 shows that the pay-for-performance relationship is contingent on the fit between CEO's strategic decisions and firm's core competency. The CEO pay is driven by the intensification of firm coopetition. We contribute to executive compensation, corporate strategy, and econometric methods.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	130-144
Number of pages	15
Journal	Managerial and Decision Economics
Volume	41
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3098
State	Published - Jan 1 2020

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Chief executive officer compensation, firm performance, and strategic coopetition: A seemingly unrelated regression approach

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