TY - GEN
T1 - Approximating matches made in heaven
AU - Chen, Ning
AU - Immorlica, Nicole
AU - Karlin, Anna R.
AU - Mahdian, Mohammad
AU - Rudra, Atri
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - Motivated by applications in online dating and kidney exchange, we study a stochastic matching problem in which we have a random graph G given by a node set V and probabilities p(i,j) on all pairs i,j V representing the probability that edge (i,j) exists. Additionally, each node has an integer weight t(i) called its patience parameter. Nodes represent agents in a matching market with dichotomous preferences, i.e., each agent finds every other agent either acceptable or unacceptable and is indifferent between all acceptable agents. The goal is to maximize the welfare, or produce a matching between acceptable agents of maximum size. Preferences must be solicited based on probabilistic information represented by p(i,j), and agent i can be asked at most t(i) questions regarding his or her preferences. A stochastic matching algorithm iteratively probes pairs of nodes i and j with positive patience parameters. With probability p(i,j), an edge exists and the nodes are irrevocably matched. With probability 1-p(i,j), the edge does not exist and the patience parameters of the nodes are decremented. We give a simple greedy strategy for selecting probes which produces a matching whose cardinality is, in expectation, at least a quarter of the size of this optimal algorithm's matching. We additionally show that variants of our algorithm (and our analysis) can handle more complicated constraints, such as a limit on the maximum number of rounds, or the number of pairs probed in each round.
AB - Motivated by applications in online dating and kidney exchange, we study a stochastic matching problem in which we have a random graph G given by a node set V and probabilities p(i,j) on all pairs i,j V representing the probability that edge (i,j) exists. Additionally, each node has an integer weight t(i) called its patience parameter. Nodes represent agents in a matching market with dichotomous preferences, i.e., each agent finds every other agent either acceptable or unacceptable and is indifferent between all acceptable agents. The goal is to maximize the welfare, or produce a matching between acceptable agents of maximum size. Preferences must be solicited based on probabilistic information represented by p(i,j), and agent i can be asked at most t(i) questions regarding his or her preferences. A stochastic matching algorithm iteratively probes pairs of nodes i and j with positive patience parameters. With probability p(i,j), an edge exists and the nodes are irrevocably matched. With probability 1-p(i,j), the edge does not exist and the patience parameters of the nodes are decremented. We give a simple greedy strategy for selecting probes which produces a matching whose cardinality is, in expectation, at least a quarter of the size of this optimal algorithm's matching. We additionally show that variants of our algorithm (and our analysis) can handle more complicated constraints, such as a limit on the maximum number of rounds, or the number of pairs probed in each round.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/70449125876
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-02927-1_23
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-02927-1_23
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:70449125876
SN - 3642029264
SN - 9783642029264
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 266
EP - 278
BT - Automata, Languages and Programming - 36th International Colloquium, ICALP 2009, Proceedings
T2 - 36th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2009
Y2 - 5 July 2009 through 12 July 2009
ER -