A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis

James R. Beebe

doi:10.1163/22105700-04010005

A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis

James R. Beebe

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a prioriknowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posterioriknowledge of contingent truths. Hamid Vahid has recently offered several reasons for thinking the unequal treatment of these two kinds of skepticism is justified, one of which is a prioriskepticism's seeming dependence upon the widely scorned kkthesis. In the present article, I defend a prioriskepticism against Vahid's criticisms.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	315-326
Number of pages	12
Journal	International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Volume	5
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-04010005
State	Published - 2014

Keywords

a priori skepticism
KK thesis
second-order knowledge
Skepticism

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10.1163/22105700-04010005

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title = "A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis",

abstract = "In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a prioriknowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posterioriknowledge of contingent truths. Hamid Vahid has recently offered several reasons for thinking the unequal treatment of these two kinds of skepticism is justified, one of which is a prioriskepticism's seeming dependence upon the widely scorned kkthesis. In the present article, I defend a prioriskepticism against Vahid's criticisms.",

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AB - In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a prioriknowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posterioriknowledge of contingent truths. Hamid Vahid has recently offered several reasons for thinking the unequal treatment of these two kinds of skepticism is justified, one of which is a prioriskepticism's seeming dependence upon the widely scorned kkthesis. In the present article, I defend a prioriskepticism against Vahid's criticisms.

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KW - KK thesis

KW - second-order knowledge

KW - Skepticism

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84948472249

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DO - 10.1163/22105700-04010005

M3 - Review article

AN - SCOPUS:84948472249

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EP - 326

JO - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

JF - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

IS - 4

ER -

A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis

Abstract

Keywords

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