A Game Theoretic Approach to the Design of Mitigation Strategies for Generic Ransomware

Recently, ransomware attacks have become widespread and are causing unprecedented damage to cyber-physical systems. Although there are various types of ransomware, this paper focuses on a generic version and analyzes it using game theory. When attacked, victims are often faced with the dilemma of deciding whether or not to pay a ransom. To assist victims in making this decision, we develop a game-theoretic model that examines the attack environment and determines the conditions under which the defender has an advantage in neutralizing the attack. We introduce two new parameters to the game model to aid in decision-making when confronted with a ransomware attack. Additionally, we present game models that depict both rational and irrational attacker behavior. We perform a sensitivity analysis on the game model in cases where the attacker behaves rationally, and demonstrate the impact of the parameters on the decision-making process and equilibrium strategies. Ultimately, we explore how the model’s outcomes can assist defenders in designing an effective defense system to prevent and mitigate future attacks of a similar nature. This also, prepares the ground for analysis of more advanced form of malware.